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Abstract 
Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s (1994) methodology developed in their 
swansong, What is Philosophy? this article deploys its own conceptual persona: the 
Neosomnambulist or new sleepwalker. Not to be mistaken for an actual living 
person, the Neosomnambulist is utilized so as to bring concepts to life.1 In this case, 
what the sleepwalker gives life to are spatiotemporal zones of indistinction that 
pervade the digital now.  
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Introduction 
Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s (1994) methodology developed in their 
swansong, What is Philosophy? this article deploys its own conceptual persona: the 
Neosomnambulist or new sleepwalker. Not to be mistaken for an actual living 
person, the Neosomnambulist is utilized so as to bring concepts to life.2 In this case, 
what the sleepwalker gives life to are spatiotemporal zones of indistinction that 
pervade the digital now. We begin with erstwhile somnambulist personae, borrowed 
from the old crowd contagion theorist, Gabriel Tarde. These old sleepwalkers were 
 
1 ‘The philosopher brings to life various personae through which concepts can live’. The conceptual persona should not however ‘be 
mistaken for a person. They are larval subjects. Through the lives of the conceptual persona, concepts are thought, perceived, and felt. 
Indeed, the production of concepts requires these intrinsic conceptual personae to be able to make interventions. Plato used Socrates for 
such purposes, and Nietzsche introduced many personae: Zarathustra, Dionysus, Overman et al’ (See Sampson, 2016: 24). 
2 ‘The philosopher brings to life various personae through which concepts can live’. The conceptual persona should not however ‘be 
mistaken for a person. They are larval subjects. Through the lives of the conceptual persona, concepts are thought, perceived, and felt. 
Indeed, the production of concepts requires these intrinsic conceptual personae to be able to make interventions. Plato used Socrates for 
such purposes, and Nietzsche introduced many personae: Zarathustra, Dionysus, Overman et al’ (See Sampson, 2016: 24). 
continuously composed in the collective mimicries of the newly animated urban 
crowds of nineteenth century industrial life. Importantly, Tarde’s sleepwalkers were 
posited as somewhat absurd subjects-in-the-making. Their openness to the imitation-
suggestibility of the crowd occurred somewhere in between sleep, mechanical habit 
and awakened cognitive volition (Sampson, 2012). What the sleepwalkers mistook to 
be their own sense of self was, in actuality, a composite of collective mimicry and 
self-other similarity.  
What defines the Neosomnambulist is a similarly poised imitative and porous social 
subjectivity. Yet, we must not confuse the sleepwalker’s porosity for stupidity, or 
indeed, wisdom. We need to smooth out some of the cruder binary aspects of crowd 
theory and its theoretical legacy in popular psychology. In the work of Gustave Le 
Bon (1895, 2002), for example, when rational individuals become absorbed by the 
crowd, there seems to be an almost magical emergence of an irrational mob 
mentality. Inversely, in more contemporary crowd theories, it is argued that the 
many are often smarter than the few (Surowiecki, 2004). In short, in both cases, the 
crowd supervenes the individual, yielding cognitive excesses, collective intelligence 
or mob mentality. The Neosomnambulists are most definitely not polarized figures 
of this kind. Their experience of the digital now is not located on either side of a 
spectrum of rational individuality, collective irrationality or indeed the smart mob 
alternative. On the contrary, the novelty of new somnambulistic experience is found 
in the breeching of barriers that are supposed to divide sleep from the cognitive and 
habitual demands of digital workloads and excessive consumption. Along these 
lines, the Neosomnambulists provide a conceptual probe that enters into 
contemporary zones of indistinction; slipping between the spatiotemporality of 
nonconscious mechanical habit and conscious user experiences.  
The Neosomnambulist is further developed in this article in order to grasp a recent 
coincidence between a mode of digital capitalism, focused on conforming user 
experiences, on one hand, and a trajectory toward racialized collective mimicries, on 
the other. In summary, this is a concurrence between the spread of far-right race hate 
and monetized social media virality, both of which perform political and economic 
expropriations of the user experience. In other words, Neosomnambulism can be 
grasped in two intersecting ways. First, it is a ramping up of the intensity, velocity, 
spreadability and similarity of user experiences in the digital economy. Second, it is 
implicated in a seemingly docile sleepwalk toward far-right populist contagions. 
Subsequently, this article develops on a methodological approach to indistinction, 
intended to resolve (and challenge) certain distinctions apparent in this coincidental 
regime, which paradoxically stirs up contagions of collective mimicry, and 
consequent identity loss, while also forcing immunological, racialized divisions. 
Moreover, in addition to raising questions concerning the disturbance of spatial 
identity through mimetic processes, the article further considers how autoimmunity 
affects temporality in these zones of indistinction. Finally, then, an alternate account 
of collective mimicry is forwarded, which although collapsing notions of self-
identity into indistinct and impersonal experiences, also opens up to the potential of 
a speculative communal mimesis. Evidently, such a collapse of the spatiotemporality 
of identity increases social anxieties concerning the loss of personal distinctiveness, 
but if these apprehensions can be overcome, then, a new concept of indistinction 
might provide an alternative to current immunological divisions. This is a concept 
that not only challenges the spatial predicating of self experiencing nonself. It also 
points toward an affirmative failure of immune systems, resulting in the possibility 
of what Margrit Shildrick (2019: 11) calls a ‘fundamental disordering of linear 
temporality,’ which in turn, provides a potential and radical reconceptualisation of 
community, without the ‘conventional bookends of life and death.’  
The Sleepwalker Returns 
A fairly recent study published in the Journal of American College Health looked at 
incidences of students in Pennsylvania reading and responding to texts while asleep 
(Dowdell and Clayton, 2017). The authors claim that what it calls ‘sleeptexting’ is an 
‘abnormal’ sleep behaviour, similar to sleepwalking, and linked to mobile phone 
dependency. These cases of sleeptexting share some similarities with French 
philosopher, Frédéric Neyrat’s (2018) contention that the digital present has little to 
do with sleep. Instead of that dulled sense of reverie one experiences when 
struggling to wake up; those zones when we can’t make out the difference between 
woken surroundings and a lingering dream, Neyrat points to protracted periods of 
wakefulness. Digital work is certainly not limited to daytime hours. Check email, 
notifications, updates, posts, tweets… Sleeping isn’t easy in these excesses of light, 
data overload, infinite linking, and myriad of other attentional demands. Neyrat 
supposes that digital work requires, as such, vigorous cognitive engagements. 
Nevertheless, perhaps the sleeptexting experience is a little fuzzier than this 
somewhat forced distinction between sleep and wakefulness suggests. Which is to 
say, such a distinction seems to miss the aspirations of corporate social media 
enterprises to manage user experiences in between conscious and nonconscious 
states. The Pennsylvanian sleeptexters may well seem like extreme cases, but the 
compulsion to take smartphones to bed is evidently a more commonplace experience 
that crosses generations. Moreover, the experience designers of these 
daytime/bedtime devices produce an array of neurologically intuitive comfort zones, 
dependent on users that are neither entirely somnolent nor wide awake. 
A closer reading of the digital now suggests that workers and consumers may 
indeed be at a somnambulate threshold; which is to say, their experiences of the 
digital now are in between these two distinct states. Theoretically speaking, there is 
clearly a connection to be made here between such thresholds and a 
Deleuzoguattarian interest in The Middle (Genosko, 1998: 91-96). Instead of erecting a 
barrier between somnolent and wakeful zones, thresholds are like those infamous, 
deterritorialized weeds that appear in between the cracks. Yet again, perhaps this 
notion of an in between (a kind of middle of nowhere) is in itself continuing to force a 
distinction? Yes, user comfort zones are designed to be intuitively felt and tacitly 
grasped. They also vary the frequency of experiences registered in the brain, since 
relaxed states are considered to be creative states. Yet, these zones induce concrete 
actions too; habits, compulsions, new work velocities and collective impulses.  In the 
intensities of experience and the subsequent clicking or swiping actions, there are 
blurry zones of indistinction, whereby the nonphenomenological world of 
somnolent experience slips into habitual ambulant user engagements. In this light, 
user experiences are neither asleep nor wide awake, or indeed, in between, but rather 
they are, at once, absurdly somnambulistic.  
This brings our discussion to the main point; which is to once again resuscitate 
Tarde’s old somnambulistic social subjects as a way to probe the digital now. Why 
bring back these old conceptual personae from nineteenth century crowd theory? 
Well, Tarde’s sleepwalkers were always situated as absurd conceptual personae. 
They would not rest easily on either side of a barrier erected between dreamy or 
uninterrupted sleep, on one hand, or the prolonged interruptions and wakefulness 
of Neyrat’s digital culture, on the other. Unlike such sharp distinctions, Tarde’s 
somnambulist brings us a little closer to what Jonathan Crary (2013: 30) calls the 
‘monotonous indistinction of 24/7’. For Crary, digital culture has similarly become a 
‘zone of insensibility’ and ‘memory loss,’ which ‘defeats…the possibility of 
experience’ (ibid., 17). In a similar way, the Neosomnambulists mess with the 
spatiotemporality of worktime founded on a distinction made between daytime and 
bedtime. Certainly, Tarde would not be at all surprised to learn about the 24/7 
sleeptexting students in Pennsylvania!  
Nonetheless, by bringing back Tarde’s somnambulist we need to carefully approach 
the idea that there are possibilities of experience to choose from. This is because 
currently there is a fuzzier struggle going on for the so-called user experience in 
terms of sleep and wakefulness. Zones of indistinction cannot simply be restricted to 
the industrial capitalist erosion of daytime and bedtime or indeed worktime and 
leisure time alone. On the contrary, what I will call experience capitalism has already 
breeched these boundaries. Much of what is produced, consumed and discarded in 
the experience economy is no longer carried out on either side of this bipolar 
spectrum, but rather occurs on much thicker spectra of spatiotemporal experiences.  
We need a Neosomnambulist who can probe the viscosity of spectra and grasp the 
user experience in the insensible and inseparable degrees between vigilance and 
sleep. A Neosomnambulist needs to probe the varying velocities of experience 
capitalism, which can no longer simply be expressed in terms of high frequency 
brainwaves at work or low frequency brainwaves at sleep. Crary’s 24/7 ultimately 
opens up the user experience to a loss of a distinction between beta and alpha waves. 
Along these lines, then, to understand the digital now, the sleepwalker concept must 
probe the neuro-management of collective user experiences. This is, it would seem, 
the principal method of experience capitalism, whereby psychological corporations, 
with their teams of experience designers, behavioural marketers, data miners and 
consumer researchers, develop on a longstanding fascination in  the spreadability of 
social influence (Simonite, 2012), on one hand, and nonconscious processing of user 
experience (Norman, 2007), on the other. Along these latter lines, then, experience 
capitalism can be grasped as a departure from older models of consumption, based 
on a theatrical subconscious or dream factory, now moving toward a 
neurochemically constituted nonconscious mode of social influence. Indeed, the user 
is said to now primarily process experience on a visceral register (located in 
neurochemical body–brain relations), before behavioural habits, moments of inward 
reflection or emotional expressions surface in cognition (ibid). Neurologically 
modelled in this way, Neosomnambulists are not thinking machines that feel; they 
are feeling machines that think. 
 
The Revolutionary Politics of Neosomnambulism 
Another reason for bringing in a Neosomnambulist is to explore how a 
corresponding visceral register of felt experience can be mapped to a recent dramatic 
slide into a political abyss. Herein, the revolutionary moment of social media no 
longer belongs to prodemocracy protesters, but has been captured by a far-right 
tendency. What can we learn about this current dilemma from the indistinctions of 
Tarde’s conceptual personae? Well, in his day, sleepwalker contagions of the 
revolutionary kind had both spatial and temporal modes. Firstly, revolutionary 
contagion spread from the industrial clusters of the urban crowd to infect an entire 
nation. Secondly, and judging by the anxieties of the French upper-classes, including 
those expressed by figures like Le Bon, revolutionary modes of nineteenth century 
collective mimesis were also perceived to spread at a dangerous, breakneck speed. 
Considered as an extension of the contagions of the urban crowd, Tarde’s newly 
mediated, imitative, and contagious impulses swept through the countryside via 
word of mouth, newsprint and telegraph wire. These contaminations made crowds 
feared entities because they shared radical political experiences that threatened the 
existing order of things. Early popular crowd psychologies, like those forwarded by 
Le Bon, were, in effect, providing a prototype of the dynamics of mob contagion; 
offering new political strategies for crowd control and modes of manipulation of the 
populace, later to be exploited by 1930s fascists (Koon, 1985: 4-5).3  
 
There are additional historical continuities and discontinuities to pick up on here. In 
the mass media climate of the 1960s, R.D. Laing (1983: 80) profoundly contended 
that by inducing similar user experiences, it is possible to more effectively steer a 
population towards more aligned and conformed behaviours and decisions. A 
population that feels the same experiences is, Laing argues, a population whose 
behaviours will become de facto more controllable (ibid). The link between shared felt 
experiences and contagion may seem continuous, but the potency (and ownership) 
 
3 Like Le Bon, Mussolini argued that the mass was a servile flock that needed a master but its multiplicity must also become magnetized by 
the prestigious image of this master. 
of the revolutionary moment it inspires seems to be less certain. Indeed, well in 
advance of the recent social media fuelled surge in the racist populisms of 
strongman, like Trump or Bolsonaro, Laing understood how inducing the feelings of 
a population and encouraging them to share the same feelings; to ‘want the same 
thing, hate the same things, feel the same threat’, would ensure that ‘their behaviour 
is already captive' (ibid).  
 
In spite of these continuities, the medium through which shared experiences spread 
has been radically transformed. In the digital now there are new political modes of 
experience, stirred into action, and given impetus, through contemporary user 
engagements with viral social media platform architectures. The sharing of felt 
experiences has, arguably, become ever more entrained. As Laing put it, once the 
alignment of experience is achieved in this way, then, ‘you have acquired your 
consumers [and] your cannon fodder' (ibid: 80). The difference now is, it would 
seem, what used to spread through time and space at breakneck speed has become 
an almost instantaneous contamination of experience. There is, indeed, a potential 
immediacy in the spreading of collective mimesis that defies the capacity of resistant 
forces to play catch.  
There are Many Sleepwalkers 
Step right up. Now showing for the first time: Cesare, the somnambulist 
(Wiene, 1920). 
The mere mention of sleepwalkers in the title of this article may well give the 
impression that current user experiences are acquiescent, mimetic acts of reverie. 
Perhaps the sleepwalkers just need to wake up! Well, some of these facets of Tarde’s 
original conceptual personae are still highly pertinent, but this is not exactly the 
proposition put forward here. There are many sleepwalkers. For example, the 
aesthetic figure of Dr Caligari’s hypnotized sleepwalker from the 1920s may appear 
to be only half-wake. His limited bandwidth of discursive attention seems narrow, 
temporarily obliviousness, sleeping or stunned.  However, although this 
somnambulist may well seem like a docile subject, he has special powers. ‘Cesare 
knows every secret. Cesare knows the past and can see into the future' (ibid). As 
Siegfried Kracauer argued back in 1947, the fairground somnambulist in Robert 
Wiene’s 1920 Expressionist film is purposefully positioned in the plot as a 
presentiment of the future tyranny in 1930s Germany. Dr Caligari is indeed the 
tyrant, and Cesare, the cannon fodder, ‘drilled to kill and to be killed’ (Kracauer, 
1947: 65).  
In spite of many ominous sleepwalker discourses, including our current 
governments sleepwalk into the Covid-19 pandemic, the Neosomnambulists are not 
necessarily docile or in need of an alarm call. To be certain, the idea of waking up the 
somnambulist misses the point that it is quite often the spreaders of crazy 
conspiracies or racist hate speech who demand that it those who refuse to collude 
that need to wake up! We certainly risk misunderstanding the many nuances of 
Tarde’s somnambulists if we mistake the sleepwalker’s absurdity for slave-like 
obedience. Along these lines, rather than equating Tarde’s social subjects with the 
vacillating, easily-led social subjects of crowd theory, these new conceptual personae 
are specifically mobilized as an expression of the contemporary collective 
nonconscious. That is to say, the focus is more precisely concerned with bringing up-
to-date the more-than-human aspects of Tarde’s microsociology; the monadic flows of 
micro-imitations that are in excess of contaminated individuals. This means 
repositioning the social subject as part of an infinitesimal relation to the world, 
experienced through insensible, and indistinct thresholds. There is nothing primarily 
new here in terms of grasping the collective nonconscious. Tarde’s original 
contagion theory was firmly located in these insensible thresholds with no ‘absolute 
separation’ or 'abrupt break, between the voluntary and the involuntary... between 
the conscious and the unconscious’ of social relationality (Tarde cited in Sampson, 
2012: 36). 
The return of the sleepwalker does, however, significantly go against the grain of 
more celebratory notions of emergent collectivity. Before the recent dark refrain of 
social media fuelled collective mimesis emerged, the trajectory of network culture 
seemed to be heading toward a more enlightened age of cognitive connectivity. As 
follows, cognitive networks have been conventionally imagined as emerging 
favourably from the unconscious. Comparable to Tarde’s nemesis, Durkheim, and 
his sociological rendition of a domineering collective consciousness emerging from 
dynamic density, Marshall McLuhan offered up a collective awaking of sorts. 
Significantly, as Adriana Braga (2016: 221) points out, McLuhan’s media extensions 
uniquely bring ‘the unconscious level of the psyche to the surface where it could 
become conscious.’ Indeed, McLuhan argued back in 1969 that media 
‘[t]echnologies… seem to be the pushing of the archetypal forms of the unconscious 
out into social consciousness’ (McLuhan, 1969: 31). In short, this means that the 
image of the technological network is reckoned to impose itself pervasively on the 
unconscious human psyche by reworking its senses and thus awakening its capacity 
for collective consciousness (Kroker, 1995).  
A Neosomnambulism is not, however, the antithesis of collective consciousness. It is 
more precisely a concept that is critical of a roused cognitive image of the network, 
which has failed to offer more searching insights into collective experiences with 
technology, dipping in and out of conscious and nonconscious experiences. Theories 
of emergent collective consciousness omit to mention, as such, how both sleep and 
wakefulness become caught up in deeply entangled digital cultures. Of course, 
McLuhan did not intend his collective awaking to be misunderstood as a crude 
emergence of collective intelligence. He was equally interested in how the downside 
of the collapse of the distinction between time and space in the media age amounted 
to trivial local gossip going global.  He would have perfectly grasped how, in the 
wake of Covid-19, crazy conspiracies about G5 networks, for example, spread in 
real-time. More precisely, by updating Tarde’s sleepwalker, these entanglements are 
conceived of as occurring on an even broader spectra of user experience than those 
normally attributed to individuals or crowds. Significantly, the concept requires a 
proposed expansion of the narrow experiential bandwidth occupied by the old 
sleepwalker that purposefully challenges the distinction made between wakefulness 
or sleep.  
We need to start by resolving the distinction between individuals and collectives. 
Significantly, then, Tarde’s social subjects are neither an individual person nor a 
collective representation of persons. Sleepwalkers are continually made and remade 
by oppositional microflows of imitation. The psychological sense of individual self is 
in effect an illusory social category marked by a sense of self that is always imitative 
and thus always etched by its relation to collectivity. This is why it is important to 
restress how a current wave of social media somnambulism presents a far more 
complex spectra of possible experiences. This contra-Durkheimian approach is not 
bipolar. It does not oscillate between individual rationality and stupefied collectives. 
The spectra of experience the sleepwalker occupies has multiple, complex and 
indistinct polarities.  
On Spectra of Somnambulism  
It is important to take our lead from Tarde’s rejection of the centrality of the 
apparent awakened state of the psychological self. This disavowal of the supremacy 
of the self-concept marks a refusal to put the intentionality of human consciousness 
at the centre of investigation. It serves as a spur for a nonphenomenological theory 
of user experience. Along these lines, the Neosomnambulist adds to the spectral 
density and frequency of experience with two ostensibly extreme, but continuously 
crisscrossed poles of somnambulist experience: somnolent and ambulant.  
On one hand, then, sleeping subjectivity is, as Matthew Fuller (2018: 1) points out, 
the ‘somnolent version of the Cretan Paradox,’ since although it provides a 
distinction between itself and ‘being awake, and thoughtful, hence conscious and 
knowing,’ sleep in itself ‘cannot be directly known in its native state.’ In other words, 
like the liar paradox, to think sleep we risk producing a self-referential logical loop 
that would frustrate the refined binary thinking of the logician. As Fuller contends: 
Sleep, unlike any other part of culture has no capacity for reflexivity 
within its own conditions. In sleeping one simply sleeps, one does not 
know, anything (ibid). 
Sleep is therefore ‘ungraspable, unwritable [and] only perceivable at its edges or its 
outside’ (ibid., 2). In sleep we may well still know something, but we lose our sense 
of self as a way of knowing it. It is only external to, or at the margins of sleep, in 
dream states or reverie, for instance, that traces of sleep can be filtered through 
conscious cognition; and that will only occur by way of a detour into wakeful 
reflection. 
The conceptual persona of the somnambulist therefore provides a unique glimpse of 
the collective nonconscious because of the exceptional condition sleep offers in terms 
of cutting out the cognitive I.  This is not the point at which fantasists and conspiracy 
theorists flip somewhere between the poles on a spectrum of rational thinking and 
irrational emotions. On the contrary, spectra present zones of indistinction where the 
psychological sense of self comes into contagious relation with others to such a 
degree of intensity and velocity that it merges with the surroundings in which 
mimetic encounters occur. It is at the extreme of spectra, in the gamma rays, that we 
find a more-than-human collective nonconscious, explained by the exceptional 
condition of sleep, cutting out the cognitive I altogether. There is not even a dream of 
self in the collective nonconscious. 
On the other hand, the sleepwalker ambulates on spectra, producing exceptional 
zones of indistinction. This is because walking is an act of mobility that allows its 
subject to insensibly drift between nonconscious to conscious experience. As the 
sleepwalker demonstrates, the act of walking can be performed when sleep falls on 
the subject. Sleepwalking is, like this, an impulsive act, which can be achieved when 
the act itself is out of mind, since its mechanical and habit-bound processes are, for 
the most part, nonconscious rather than conscious.   
Walking is a collective experience of mimesis too, wherein bodily interactions of 
different speeds and rhythms become entrained with other bodies. As research into 
unintentional bodily synchrony in the field of entrainment studies reveals, it is 
important to avoid a wakeful cognitivist bias, which states that it is only in 
consciousness that walking becomes real. As Clayton et al argue (2005: 70), in 
entrainment theory ‘any bodily implementation of interacting processes is real, no 
matter whether it is consciously experienced or not.’ Moreover, entrainment theory 
provides insights into the collective nonconscious that can be transposed to the 
study of digital culture. For example, the nonconscious entrainment of footsteps on a 
pavement can be substituted for the habitual social media user’s fingers and thumbs 
grasping, clutching, clicking and scrolling, as captured brilliantly in Esmeralda 
Kosmatopoulos's installation Fifteen Pairs of Mouths, exhibited at the Crary inspired 
24/7 show in London in 2019, (see figure 1 – pending permission?).  
 
Figure 1 Esmeralda Kosmatopoulos's Fifteen Pairs of Mouths. 
In lieu of the rhythmic entrainments of walkers, coupled together through the 
bobbing of heads, or the synchronizations of marching arms and legs, we find the 
algorithmically orchestrated and rhythmic coordination of prodding fingers and 
thumbs. This is the sleepwalker’s experience of the ambulant technological 
nonconscious. Significantly, these are not merely physical entrainments. Research 
into entrained self-other similarity suggests a folding of the relation between 
physical behaviours (e.g. synchronized finger tapping) and emotionally felt 
experiences, like empathy and other prosocial contagions (Clayton et al, 2005: 70). 
Users who scroll together, feel together.  
Playing Along to a Dark Refrain  
The conceptual antennae of the Neosomnambulists are purposefully turned toward 
a particularly dark refrain in the social media age. This is a very different refrain to 
that previously marked by optimistic accounts of a deterritorialized digital culture. 
This is a moment when the potentiality of revolutionary social media contagions, 
like the Arab Spring, have become deeply entangled in far-right spatiotemporal 
territorializations, engendered in recent months in the far-right refrains of Covid-19 
denial and anti-vax, for example. 
 
To understand the spatiotemporality of these territorial refrains, we need to briefly 
grasp a rudimentary appreciation of musical improvisation (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1987: 310-350).4 Deterritorialized lines of flight and territorial refrains are indeed 
mutual concepts that most improvising musicians will be familiar with. On one 
hand, imagine earlier lines of flight in digital culture as the jagged edges of a 
clashing, a-rhythmic and discordant musical performance. They are the beginning of 
an improvisation that initially refuses (intentionally or accidentally) to settle into any 
kind of recognisable groove. There was no precise tempo set; no opening bars to 
conform to. Nothing is composed, as such. These notes without order appear like the 
random scribbles on Sylvano Bussoti’s musical staff (ibid., 3).5 They are scattered 
notes that become-other. The refrain of far-right contagion is, on the other hand, a 
moment in the improvisation when players begin to fall into a repeated pattern of 
 
4 Inspiration for the dark refrain comes from the ritornello or refrain concept as discussed in Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 310-350). 
5 See further discussion on a similar communication model in Genosko (2012). 
notes. These notes might become harmonized; syncopated; their uneven rhythms are 
quantized. At the same time, the assemblage of players become biomusicologically 
entrained. Which is to say, there is synchronized foot tapping, arms and instruments 
swing together; heads bob in unison.  
 
This shared felt experience of improvised music can of course become an exuberant 
repetition. The groove can be a feely lure; a joyous inducement or seduction of everyone 
assembled in its cadence. The musicians and the audience similarly begin to pulse together, 
swaying to the same rhythm. Yet, despite the promise of musical joy, these movements 
can be pegged in such a way as to determine what comes next. The key fixes the line 
to a predicable scale of repetitive notes; a familiar chord progression. Things start to 
repeat themselves over and over again, without difference. This is a crowd theory of 
sorts. One is reminded of John Protevi’s (2010) observations of the joyful pulsating 
affects of the Nazis’ Nuremberg Rallies (2010). Again, it’s not just bodies that become 
entrained. The pulse acts as an affective contagion, bringing body rhythms, feelings 
and emotional expressions into line with each other. The dark refrain has become a 
staccato-like repetition of a racist populist politics, spreading throughout the world: 
Trump, Salvini, Putin, Modi, Bolsonaro, Johnson, Farage, Le Pen, Alternative for Germany 
(AfD), Orban, Wilders… It is a refrain punctuated by micro and macro-fascisms, 
failing immunity systems, rampant, yet botched capitalism, and neo-Nazis mass 
shootings. It becomes problematic trying to break out of such a rut. Musicians, 
audiences, political rallies - all become-the-same.   
This is a visceral refrain that spreads like wildfire on social media, stirring up white 
working-class rage against immigration. Trump and Bolsonaro’s followers, for 
example, take full advantage of these platforms to register emotive appeals to a 
population through fear and anxiety, but also through hurried and confused 
fabrications. It is, indeed, on this visceral register that William E Connolly (2017: 14-
15) identifies the ‘conceptual cloudiness’ of the aspirational fascist’s Big Lie strategy, 
pitched against the fact-checking distinctions of liberal media. These cloudy concepts 
present zones of feely indistinction, intended to purposefully undermine experts and 
investigative journalists. The refrain is not, however, simply irrational. On the 
contrary, it is on the visceral register that these far-right political fiction machines 
twist and distort democracy, moving at different speeds, weakening the impartiality 
of trusted media, controlling intelligence, and inhibiting plural societies (ibid., 8).  
The dark refrain is intimately coupled to aspirational fascism, on one hand, and an 
economic expropriation of the user experience, on the other. Along these lines, social 
media users not only give away the ownership of their community relations to 
parasitic corporate social media platforms, but the prodemocratic potential of 
revolutionary contagion has been utterly dispossessed. Remember Laing’s words! 
When a population feels the same hate, feels the same fear; when it begins to share 
the same experience, the same tempos and rhythms, then, we have produced 
compliant consumers and cannon fodder (Laing, 1967: 80). 
 
Methodological Indistinctions 
Zones of indistinction can now be resolutely linked to a methodology. Borrowing 
from Roger Caillois’s (2003) proposal in 1935 that the fundamental role of all study is 
to set about resolving distinctions, this methodology endeavours to tackle a series of 
forced divisions. Important to this procedural development is Caillois’s study on 
collective mimesis, which focuses on how insects blend into their environment 
through camouflage. In short, for Caillois, the process by which biological 
camouflage merges an organism into its surroundings presents a disruption to 
perception insofar as what is assumed to be in the foreground is lured into the 
background. By looking to resolve such distinctions, Caillois’s method draws on the 
indistinct nature of things; the vagueness of it all. Of course, some Gestalt minded 
colleagues will probably say that a failure to make a distinction is in itself a failure of 
perception. Certainly, we go against Gestalt principles if we fail to distinguish the 
emergence of foreground from background. Be this as it may, indistinction does not 
really concern perception as a higher-level cognitive faculty. It is rather regarded as 
a method that allows some limited access to preperception; a way of modestly 
slipping into the immediacy of nonphenomenological impersonal experience.  
 
There is perhaps nothing particularly new about indistinction as method. There is 
indeed a long history of indistinct practices in art, for example, wherein the art critic, 
Adrian Stokes (2012: 112-13), for example, notes how the ‘embracing or enveloping 
quality’ of Turner's art came about because of its ‘indistinctness’ and ‘loss of 
definition.’ In literature too, there are aesthetic figures that are made purposefully 
indistinct. Gatsby is a great illusive figure in this sense. He remains purposefully 
blurred for much of Fitzgerald’s book; a figure that assimilates the background and 
blends into that big old house in the cause of dramatic effect. Likewise, artists like 
Mikey B Georgeson consolidate a broader sense of aesthetic ontologies of 
indistinction. Through his Auto Matter Flow Morning Drawings of the 
Neosomnambulist (see figure 2), and further experiments with the glitches of green 
screen technology, Georgeson produces a kind of art of indistinction that draws on 
what Gary Genosko (1998: 96) has called the ‘enemy of crisp synthesis.’ We can see 
how Georgeson’s sleepwalker illustration adopts the persona to slip ‘in between’ the 
woken distinction made between two other predicated protagonists. As follows, 
Georgeson’s sleepwalker becomes a speculative rather than a signifying aesthetic 
fact. In short, indistinction is an aesthetic methodology that simply refuses to make 
forced distinctions. The doodling, ‘noodling,’ ‘fuzziness,’ and ‘muddiness’ (Genosko 
(1998: 96) of indistinctness resists border regimes by sliding in between foreground 
and background, and mind and matter, in the same fashion as the somnambulist 
slips in between sleep and wakefulness. 
 
 
 Figure 2: Auto Matter Flow Morning Drawing of the Somnambulist. Illustration by Mikey B Georgeson 
Although, Caillois was primarily interested in the spatial qualities of these lures that 
bring about indistinction, the method can also alert us to temporal slippages. These 
slippages reveal something that Neyrat’s digital now overlooks. These zones are also 
not limited to the kind of cultures apparent in Crary’s 24/7, which drift between 
macro time shifts, like daytime and bedtime. Instead the method draws attention to 
varied micro-speeds and tiny slippages associated with brain frequencies 
throughout the working day. Sleep and work have been, for the most part, 
respectively associated with low and high wave frequencies. But the sleepwalker 
demonstrates that this is not always the case. Certainly, whereas industrial and post-
industrial capitalism were seemingly all about the alignment of fast brainwaves to 
even faster work patterns, resulting in cognitive overloads, for example, experience 
capitalism is arguably about triggering indistinctions between varying frequencies. 
After all, if a business really wants to make its workers and consumers more creative 
in the workplace, it is the interferences between frequencies which will produce new 
patterns of work. So, the digital now is not just about being fast and awake or indeed 
online. To be clear, the introduction of sleeping or napping pods to digital 
workplaces, show how slow frequencies are being blended in with fast worktime. As 
one trade magazine puts it: 
The Google office in Sydney features pod-like compartments for quiet work 
time. There’s also a nap pod for solid sleep time. But if you’re somewhere in 
between work and sleep, the “work” compartments… might be the perfect spot 
to get a bit more done, then drift off into a peaceful sleep away from the noise of 
coworkers (Simmons, 2020). 
Mimicry and Multiplicity 
The sleepwalker can be uniquely grasped as a probe that enters into the perils and 
potential of collective mimesis. What is of interest here are the ways in which 
indistinctions contest the politics of border regimes that tend to make immunological 
distinctions between, for example, self and other, or more precisely, self and nonself. 
To fully register the political implications of this methodological approach, it is 
necessary to address a significant question concerning what it means to survive in 
borderless encounters, like those currently occupied by the Neosomnambulist. 
Importantly, then, the method needs to challenge the forced distinctions presented 
by the various immunopolitical regimes that are steering the possibilities of 
experience toward what Patricia Clough (2010) calls population racism. Such a 
survival – in between the cracks – inverses the preservation of homogenous 
distinctions common to immune system logic. Indeed, following various authors, 
like Caillois (2003), but also Roberto Esposito (2008; 2011), indistinctions can be used 
to replace the typically perilous analysis of immune system failures with the 
promising potential of communal mimicry and cultural multiplicity.  
 
To begin with, we need to grasp the logics of immunopolitics. As a general rule, 
immune systems function as border regimes. They are designed to force distinctions 
between self and non-self. Following immunologics, the collapse of a distinction 
between, on one hand, an entity (e.g. a self or a body), and on the other hand, certain 
anomalies (e.g. a nonself or antibody), poses a risk to the stability or even the 
lifespan of said entity. The problem being that a failure to force a distinction between 
entity and anomaly means that certain protections and exemptions afforded to the 
entity from its perilous surroundings, begin to breakdown. The collapse of the 
barrier immunity provides between interiority and exteriority clearly makes the 
entity vulnerable to destabilizing contagions of various kind, as well as exposing it 
to potential predators. However, for Caillois (2003), the principle of becoming 
distinct is neither the general rule of things nor does it necessarily guarantee 
stability. Along these lines, Caillois’s study of insect camouflage counters orthodox 
evolutionary thinking on biological subsistence attained through exemption. By 
blending in to their surroundings certain insects would, for example, transform 
themselves into plants that other insects eat. The remains of mimetic insects are 
indeed as abundant in the stomachs of predators as those that cannot change their 
visual appearance. In effect, at first glance, the dangers of camouflage seem to 
outweigh the immunological benefits. To be sure, by transforming themselves into 
the foodstuff of their own species, insects risk taking part in a horrific masochistic act 
of collective cannibalization! 
 
Caillois’s desire to resolve distinctions contributes to the method of indistinction in 
two important and seemingly contradictory ways. Firstly, it helps grasp a cross-
context immunity problem that considers how the freedom immunity affords the 
entity is replaced by dangerous zones of indistinction. Which is to say, as the borders 
between the entity and its surroundings collapse, distinctions become increasingly 
blurred, porous, and folded. Dependent on which context this zone of indistinction 
occurs in (biological, biopolitical, psychological, technological etc.), the contaminated 
entity might face a loss of self-identity, integrity or even life. In the case of Caillios’s 
camouflaged insects, a tendency toward the spatial lure of the organism’s 
environment leads to the collapse of immunological borders, rendering the organism 
indistinguishable from its surroundings, and as a consequence, vulnerable to self-
destructive, collective mimicry. In effect, the dispossessed entity is transformed into 
the nonentity, leading to a seemingly dreadful loss of distinction.  
Importantly, the scope of Caillois’s method infolds from the physical dissolving of 
immunological boundaries between a sentient organism and its surroundings to the 
dispossession of mind. This is to say, the emptying of a subject, if you like, leads to 
intensified feelings of disorientation, fear, anxiety, and even psychosis. Secondly, 
though, the apparent horror of Caillois’s self-destruction (physical and psychical), 
which follows on from machoistic collective mimesis, suggests a potentially radical 
rethinking of shared experience. This is an experience that has been compromised by 
all out contagion, but its collapse into indistinction nonetheless brings about 
something new in terms of communal relations. As follows, in Caillios’s doubly 
dangerous luxury of mimesis we find something affirmative about becoming 
indistinct. This is Caillois’s alternative resolution to his ‘fundamental question’ of 
distinction. As John Hamilton (2012: 6) argues, it is ‘[p]recisely because [Caillois’s] 
mimicry blends the individual into its environment, [that] it also serves as a basis for 
community’. So, although we seem to be in the grip of this current dark refrain of 
collective mimicry, which poses a persistent threat to cultural multiplicity, the loss of 
self-representation; its collapse into indistinction, promises experimentations with 
new community forms, yet to come.  
To be clear, there are some notably conceptual resonances between Caillois’s 
collective mimesis and Esposito’s similar desire to reconsider community as the 
inverse of Nazis immunological modes of exemption. Which is to say, in many ways, 
the logics of Caillois’s notion of immunity are similarly interlinked with the more 
affirmative logics of Esposito’s concept of community. As Esposito (2011) contends, 
immunity presupposes community in the sense that the former provides a 
biopolitically constituted individual exemption from the ‘expropriating effects’ of 
the latter. There is ‘no community without some kind of immunitary apparatus,’ 
such as that provided by law, for example (ibid., 16). For Esposito, immunity and 
community are therefore a continuum. A certain kind of negative immunity is 
nevertheless grasped as thwarting the possibilities of a more affirmative version of 
community that otherwise might challenge the immunological excesses of these 
biopolitical regimes (Campbell in Esposito, 2008: xi-xxix). 
Like Caillois, then, Esposito goes on to show how the logics of contagion are 
similarly coupled to both immunity and community. For example, Esposito (2008: 
105) points to the potential power of social inoculation. As he puts it, the biggest 
threat to a community’s vitality is not posed by infections from the outside, but is 
rather produced by efforts to preserve internal stability. 
 
[T]he more the community is preserved intact, the more the level of 
innovation is reduced. The greatest danger that the community faces is 
therefore its own preventative withdrawal from danger (ibid). 
 
What a community needs in order to persist is not therefore immunological 
stability and exemption, but instead a ‘viral fragment’ needs to be inserted into the 
‘collective organism’ (Esposito, 2008: 106).6  
 
What can we learn from the logics of contagion, so that we can confront the dark 
refrain of populist racism? To begin with, this need for inoculation exposes the 
complete futility of the Nazis. Their ultimate failure emerged in their efforts to 
normalize their hideous concept of a pure population by irradiating what they 
perceived as impurity. The Nazis were an architype of racist immunopolitics. 
Hitler’s use of immunological terminology, for example, saw his fight against racial 
impurity as ‘equal to those fought by Pasteur and Koch’ (cited in Esposito, 2008: 
122). In effect, by trying to stabilize a specific kind of racist life, the Nazis needed 
death (ibid., 117). This propensity towards death is a mode of autoimmunity or the 
 
6 Evidently, in the wake of Covid-19, these differences between immunity, community and contagion have taken on a new urgency. The 
remit here is restricted to a different question. 
collective masochism of immunopolitics that comes to the fore in demise of the 
Nazis.  
Speculative Mimesis 
Indistinction is evidently an experimental and problematic methodology, thwart 
with dangers. There is even a hint of horror autotoxicus or the doom-laden 
encounters with a Platonic double in the making of indistinction. This is because 
although the concealment of distinction through camouflage would seem to offer the 
organism a unique opportunity to blend into its surrounding and survive, Caillois 
initially sees no evolutionary advantage to nonhuman mimicry of this kind. Such is 
the danger of collective mimicry that by wearing the mask of its predator, or by 
trying to blend in, a collective organism may actually transform itself into its own 
predators’ prey, or worse, a cannibal’s lunch. So, surrendering to indistinction will 
always be a painful experience.  
Similarly, the organic desire to preserve the psychic feeling of self-representation is 
severely disrupted by indistinction. Which is to say, a mode of horror autotoxicus 
collapses the distinction between self-representation and self-destruction into a 
moment of potentially deadly indistinction. It is nonetheless this failure of psychic 
immunity, and Caillois’s more positive account of a doubly dangerous luxury of 
collective masochism, which prompts a new theoretical alternative to be considered. 
Herein, the loss of self-representation to collective masochism may well lead to 
communal mimicry. This is a mode of community quite unlike our current 
sleepwalk toward the abyss, embodied as it is by far-right nationalist identities of 
resemblance and immunopolitics. Importantly, communal mimicry must not simply 
become an acceleration of immunological forces! It instead celebrates the collapsing 
of nationalistic borders and racist distinctiveness into a massive-scale mimicry of 
cultural multiplicity.  
Speculative mimesis becomes something of a necessity in terms of making a break 
from the fascist captures of community that social media helps to condition through 
the pass-on- power of homophilious echo chambers. This does not mean, however, 
that we simply replace or oppose immunopolitics with an ideal model of 
community. Speculative mimesis may provide an expedient starting place, but what 
is really needed is a concerted effort to rethink the concept of community anew. To 
be more precise, then, what we need is a speculative mimicry that might provide the 
ultimate expression of a new concept of community, pushing ‘the apparatus of 
identity beyond the threshold of sameness’ (Esposito, 2008: 88). 
Neosomnambulist Indistinction  
 
Figure 3 The Indistinction of the Self-Other Relation. Illustration by Mikey. B Georgeson  
 
To conclude, then, there are both spatial and temporal aspects to 
Neosomnambulism. On one hand, there is, in addition to physical blending, what 
Rosalind Krauss (2008: 155) points out as a ‘peculiarly psychotic yielding to the call 
of ‘space’. This is the collapsing of the Gestalt figure and ground in both a physical 
and psychical sense, likened by Krauss to a ‘slackening of the contours of 
[organism’s] integrity, of its self-possession’ (ibid). Indeed, Caillois’s method 
explicitly challenges the entire notion of a discrete personality when he concludes 
that the person is not the origin of the spatial coordinates of the surroundings that 
are mimicked. The person is rather just one among many of coordinates of spatial 
capture. This is a critical destabilization of the feeling of personality grasped as 
indistinct from its material surroundings. As Caillois (1935; 2003: 28) puts it:  
The feeling of personality, considered as the organism’s feeling of 
distinction from its surroundings, of the connection between 
consciousness and a particular point in space, cannot fail under these 
conditions to be seriously undermined. 
 
On the other hand, as Shildrick (2019) contends, it is the failure of immunity or 
autoimmunity that enables us to further rethink temporality away from the 
bookends of life and death. Drawing on her discussion on the temporal aspects of 
Esposito’s affirmative concept of immunological breakdown, I would like to venture 
that aside from the seemingly inevitable death of a selfhood with autoimmune 
disease, we should take into further consideration the temporal entanglements of 
sleepwalkers or collective nonconscious. As already discussed, the sleepwalkers are 
not negative personae; they are affirmative becomings, giving life to a concept. In 
similar ways, these liminal subjects attempt to do what Shildrick (2019: 21) aims to 
do in her work, which is to ultimately escape the ‘modernist boundaries of selfhood 
and embrace the possibilities of transformation’. The imitative sleepwalkers are not a 
person that either lives now or dies in the future; the conceptual personae are a 
becoming other caught up in the speculative mimicry of indistinction. This 
understanding of the temporal situating of the sleepwalker is moreover reminiscent 
of Grosz who argues that in order for transformation to take place, we need to grasp 
the temporality of our past and future judged according to the instabilities of 
personhood (Grosz cited in Shildrick, 2019: 21). Indeed, the residue of collective 
mimesis is not a new personhood; it is, as we have seen, speculative and 
transformative. This is where a new concept of community may well live on. 
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